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PANEL II: Maurice Clarett’s Challenge
Moderator:
Panelists:

Jay Moyer*
Howard Ganz†
David Feher‡
Gary Roberts§
David Cornwell||

MR. KLEIN: Our second panel of the day deals with one of the
most controversial court decisions affecting the sports world in
recent history.1 Maurice Clarett has challenged the NFL’s rule
barring any player from entering the draft until three years after his
high school graduation.2 Because Judge Scheindlin in the
Southern District of New York ruled in Clarett’s favor, Clarett,
among others, will be eligible for this year’s draft.3
This issue, however, is far from resolved.4 Just this week, the
National Football League (“NFL”) and the NFL Players
Association (“NFLPA”) began discussions to alter the collective
bargaining agreement to include language prohibiting this type of
early entry into the draft.5
Our moderator for this panel is Professor Jay Moyer. Professor
Moyer was the National Football League’s first in-house attorney.
*

Professor, Fordham University School of Law
Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP
‡
Partner, Dewey Ballantine LLP
§
Deputy Dean & Director of Sports Law Forum
||
President, DNK Cornwell
1
Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Clarett I], rev’d in
part, vacated in part, remanded by Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Clarett II].
2
Id. at 382.
3
Id. at 410–11. However, Judge Scheindlin’s ruling was overturned by the Second
Circuit. See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124. Therefore, Clarett was not, in fact, eligible for the
2004 NFL draft.
4
As previously noted, the decision was overturned by the Second Circuit. See Clarett
II, 369 F.3d at 124.
5
The 3-year rule is not currently part of the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement
with the players’ association. See Chris Harry, Clarett, NFL Near Collision; Ohio State
Star Sues for the Right to Be Drafted, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 24, 2003, at D1.
†
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He was subsequently named the Executive Vice President and
League Counsel by then-Commissioner Peter Rozelle. Professor
Moyer received his undergraduate degree at Dartmouth College
and his law degree at Duke Law School. I’m pleased to introduce
Professor Jay Moyer.
PROF. MOYER: Good morning.
For those of you who have been on another planet for the last
year or so, Maurice Clarett, star running back as a freshman at
Ohio State University and member of that year’s national
championship team when only two years out of high school, sued
in the Southern District of New York to overturn the NFL’s draft
eligibility rule, which requires that players be out of high school
for at least three full football seasons before they may be eligible to
be drafted.6 However, it’s a fundamental practice that no player
ever comes into the NFL without being subject to a draft.7 That’s
what makes the draft eligibility rule rather critical.
On February 5, 2004, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District
issued a long opinion granting summary judgment to Clarett on the
grounds that the NFL’s eligibility rule violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and is not protected by the non-statutory labor
exemption from antitrust laws.8
I predict that you will find significant divisions of opinion on
the panel here today, but I don’t think you will find anyone who
will say that Judge Scheindlin got it all right. The one thing she
did get right in her opinion, for sure, was her observation that this
case raised “serious questions arising at the intersection of labor
law and antitrust law.”9
In the next hour-plus, our purpose will be to explore the
implication of this decision for the law and for the NFL, for
college football and for young athletes, assuming the decision is
6

See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
But see Mike O’Hara, Undrafted Doesn’t Mean Unwanted, DETROIT NEWS, May 31,
2002, at 4H (“For the rookie free agents signed by the Lions after this year’s draft, the
evidence is all around them that the draft is not the only way to make an NFL roster. The
Lions have 14 players on the 2002 roster who played for them last year and were not
drafted by any NFL team . . . .”).
8
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–411.
9
Id. at 382.
7
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upheld on appeal,10 and to the extent possible, we will examine
whether or not it will be upheld by the Second Circuit and, if it
comes to that, by the United States Supreme Court.11
We have a very distinguished panel today. Going from my
immediate left, we have David Cornwell of Newport Beach,
California, who has a long history in a number of positions in
professional sports; David Feher, a partner in the firm of Dewey
Ballantine in New York; Howard Ganz, a partner in the firm of
Proskauer Rose; and, on my far left, Professor Gary Roberts, who
after cutting his teeth at Covington & Burling in Washington, a
firm that has been a major legal player over the years in sports
litigation, became Professor of Law at Tulane Law School and is
widely known and widely quoted. I won’t belabor their bios
because you can read them in your materials.
What we’ll try to do is have each panelist give his views,
hopefully succinctly but as completely as possible, in a space of
ten minutes or so, and then we will open it up to questions and to
interplay between and among the panelists.
I would like to ask Mr. Feher to begin this process. David?
MR. FEHER: Thank you, Jay.
I want to start off by saying that because this case is currently
pending, and also because my partner Jeff Kessler and I are regular
outside counsel to the NFL Players Association and the NBA
Players Association, nothing that I say today is being said on
behalf of either of those entities, but, rather, is just my personal
opinion.
The other thing I want to say isthis relates more to me than
to other folkssince we did represent the NFL Players
Association in collective bargaining in these various matters, in
terms of the facts as to what happened or did not happen, I am not
going to comment on it at all because Judge Scheindlin did base
her decision on various debates as to the facts and did reach certain

10

On appeal, the decision was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. See
Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
11
The United States Supreme Court denied Clarett’s application for certiorari. See
Clarett v. NFL, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231 (Apr. 22, 2004).
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conclusions.12 So when we discuss the case, I am going to
basically speak hypothetically but not testify in any way, shape, or
form on that. I don’t want to go in that direction.
What Jay said, though, in terms of how this case relates to the
intersection of labor laws and antitrust laws, that’s the nub of the
issue inI was going to say in large part, but I think almost in its
entirety. Let me just lay a little bit of a background so that we all
can have a common basis for at least the premise as to what
happens when the antitrust laws and the labor laws are both at
play.13
Fundamentally, there is an inherent tension between the
structure of the labor laws and the structure of the antitrust laws in
that the antitrust laws are designed to ensure competition and
competitive markets among the various participants14 and those
antitrust laws have been in place for a long time, since the
Sherman Antitrust Act15 enacted at the end of the 19th century.
But at the same time, the federal labor laws are in many ways
antithetical to free competition, in the sense that when labor and
management were exercising their various choices and rights in the
early 20th century, there was a lot of strife in this country. Many
workers believed that completely free competition among workers
in the employment markets was not serving the workers especially
well, and the workers fought long and hard for the right not to
compete individually in the labor markets, but, rather, to
collectively organize and to collectively bargain.16 The federal
labor laws were enacted on the principle that workers can come
12

See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 404–10.
Id.
14
See Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 592 (2001) (“There is a tension between antitrust and labor
law, as the aim of antitrust law is to promote competition and discourage collective
behavior, while the aim of labor law is to utilize collective activity to protect workers’
rights. A series of judicial decisions has interpreted the legislation to alleviate this
tension by providing a clear governing structure for determining how to protect both
labor and competition.”).
15
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004).
16
See generally FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Trade Unions in the United
States (2004).
13
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together and by majority decision form a union that will bargain on
behalf of all of the employees in the bargaining unit and, in effect,
take the place of any and all individual bargaining by the
employees that would otherwise occur in the absence of a union.17
This notion of collective bargaining once a union is
formednot solely once the union is formed but as you get into
the collective bargaining process and the various stepsdoes not
permit individual decisions by employees to either accept or reject
individual employment offers from employers in unionized
industries.
If you are an auto worker, where the United Auto Workers
represents the employees in that industry, and you try to get a job
with Ford, you cannot go to Ford and say, “Look, I don’t like the
wage scale that the United Auto Workers has agreed upon with
you, and I want to individually bargain with Mr. Bill Ford as to
how much I should be paid.”
Well, if you’re in the collective bargaining unit, under the
federal labor laws, you have a collective bargaining representative
and that collective bargaining representative has the exclusive
authority to bargain in various areas with respect to mandatory
subjects of bargainingwages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employmentas well as other areas.18 Fundamentally, the union
is the exclusive bargaining representative.
That’s the backdrop as to how the labor laws are different than
what applies when you have free competition.
But a different question comes up because in certain industries
they may not necessarily want a union. From the entertainmentsports perspective, because of supply and demand and how the
industry is structured, for the employees in industries such as the
NFL and the NBA, there are advantages to having free
competition.
Employees in those industries have multiemployers—it’s not all just one employer—and there are many
teams that are operated, and we can get into debates about single

17
18

Id.
See generally FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Labor Relations (2004).
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entities, which do negotiate for players individually.19 You don’t
have the Jets negotiating for the Giants, or vice versa; each team is
negotiating individually.
And, since there is competition in those markets due to the way
they have been structured, the players quite often feel that they
would be better served by having competitive markets rather than
having a wage scale.20 From time to time, whenever the union and
management are in debates, there are discussions about cost
certainty and all of this, but as a bottom line, the players, whom I
represent, usually believe that competition is a good thing and it is
better to have a system in place that ensures that the various teams
in a given league compete for the services of players.
Now, as a basic predicateand this gets into more nuanced
questions from time to timeit is not always possible for the
players to have a union and to agree with management that we
have a collective bargaining agreement reached under labor laws,
and that we’re all agreed that this is a fine system that should go
forward.
While everyone in a perfect world would always like to have a
complete absence of disputes and no situations where an
agreement is impossible, that doesn’t always happen. It has
happened from time to time in the NFL and the NBA where the
players and the owners just could not reach agreement.21 And
from time to time in those circumstances, the players have said,
“Well, we need to have competition,” and the labor laws just are
not working for the players in that circumstance.
There was a long series of disputes and cases in terms of
exactlylet me see if I can simplify this because this is a little bit
19

See, e.g., Barry Wilner, When Owners Get in the Way: Jerry Jones Isn’t the First—
and He Won’t Be the Last—Head of a Team to Venture into Areas Where He Simply
Doesn’t Belong, FOOTBALL DIGEST, Feb. 2002 (discussing NFL team owners and how
they
sign
players),
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FCL/is_6_31/ai_81789955.
20
See, e.g., NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. II § 3, available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cba/articleII.html#section3 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (allowing
players in their “individual contract negotiations” to “agree upon provisions . . . setting
forth cash compensation.”).
21
See, e.g., Playing Hardball: Sports Labour Disputes, at http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-141-1430/sports/sports_disputes/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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complicatedbut whenever there is an agreement, certainly an
agreement between the union and management on terms and
conditions of employment, and that agreement is still in effect,
there is something that is called the non-statutory labor exemption
to the antirust laws.22
Let me just give the starkest example. We have a collective
bargaining agreement in the NFL that says there is a salary cap.23
That agreement is currently in place. If a current player in the NFL
says, “I don’t like the salary cap. I want to file an antitrust suit
against the salary cap that is in this agreement between the union
and management,” the non-statutory labor exemption, which is
something that courts have developed, dictates that he cannot file
an antitrust suit.24 In order to permit the labor laws to function
effectively in this circumstance and in order to uphold this
collective bargaining agreement, antitrust suits may not be filed to
challenge what has been agreed to between management and
labor.25
The Clarett case deals not with that particular circumstance but
with a different issue.26 I won’t get into all of the details, but
essentially Maurice Clarett isn’t a current player in the NFL; he’s a
college player who wants to join the union and wants to join the
NFL as a player.27 And so here we’re talking about a slightly
different situation from the extreme: does the exemption apply to
prohibit or not prohibit Mr. Clarett from filing an antitrust suit
against the rules that the NFL has put in place with respect to the
college draft?28
The reason why we’re having this debate, is partly because of
Mr. Clarett’s status, as he is not a current NFL player.29 If he were
a current NFL player challenging any NFL rules in the collective
bargaining agreement, it wouldn’t be an issue. But there is a
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See Fuhrman, supra note 14, at 593–97.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593–97.
Id.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See id. at 382.
See id. at 390–97.
See id. at 395–96.
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factual question that Judge Scheindlin addressed: what is the status
of the eligibility rules?30
Undoubtedly, if you pick up the collective bargaining
agreement in the NFL, there is no provision setting forth all the
college eligibility rules.31 Rather, there are provisions that crossreference other matters.32 The NFL argues in Clarett that because
of various cross-references and provisions as to what the NFLPA
will or will not do in terms of supporting certain suits, the
eligibility rules are effectively brought within the scope, such that
it should be protected by this non-statutory labor exemption.33
And so, in terms of the backdrop, we have the intersection
between the labor laws and the antitrust laws and we have other
cases that have arisen dealing with fairly clear circumstances
where something is in a collective bargaining agreement and
someone is challenging it.
For example, there is a Leon Wood case34 that has been cited
where a player who was coming into the NBA challenged the
provisions of the salary cap as it applied to people who were
entering the NBA.35 The Second Circuit in a clear opinion said
that you cannot file an antitrust suit there.36 Here we have a salary
cap agreement between the union and management, and even
though you are entering the NBA, it doesn’t make a difference in
terms of that provision being protected.37
Clarett deals not with that precise question, but with someone
who wants to enter the NFL and avoid application of a rule that is

30

See id. at 385–87, 396–97.
See id. at 385–87.
32
See id. See generally NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, arts. XVI–XVII
[hereinafter NFL CBA], at http://www.nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (discussing selection and compensation of
rookies, among other such matters relating to the draft).
33
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396–97.
34
Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
35
See id.
36
See id. at 963 (explaining that the prohibition, in collective bargaining agreement
between National Basketball Association and National Basketball Players Association, on
player corporations could not be challenged on antitrust grounds).
37
See id. at 957.
31
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not word-for-word contained within the collective bargaining
agreement.38 So there are factual issues.39
I know that history has been a bit complicated. I hope that it
has at least laid the basic framework for how we got to the
litigation.
I don’t want to go on too long, Jay. If you want to have
someone else describe what Judge Scheindlin actually decided and
didn’t decide, that’s fine with me. If you want me to go on, I can.
PROF. MOYER: That’s a good suggestion, David. For that
purpose, I will turn to Professor Gary Roberts and turn him loose
on this topic.
PROF. ROBERTS: All right, Jay.
Let me start off by saying that for the last twenty-one years I
have taught sports law at Tulane, and I think if there is one thing I
have learned, it’s that the term “sports law” is almost an
oxymoron. It seems that in so many instances when labor law
cases or antitrust cases or contract cases, or whatever you have,
come into a court of law or before an arbitrator, the judges, the
arbitrators, and the jurors, because the cases involve sports, just go
stark, raving nuts. They start issuing opinions that are just flat-out
stupid. They don’t follow the law.
The story we heard from the last panel, where the juror leaned
over and gave Coach Bryant the glassesI’m not surprised at all
by that, because it’s such a common phenomenon.40 The visibility,
the passions, and the interest that sports stir causes courts to do
really stupid things.41
And Judge Scheindlin has continued the trend. This case was
one of the most abominable decisions I have ever seen. I want to
spend a little time going through it.
38

See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379.
See id.
40
In the midst of the 1994 Major League Baseball strike, for example, a San Francisco
judge cut Giants star Barry Bonds’ monthly family support payments in half and then
asked Bonds for his autograph. The judge subsequently withdrew from the case and
reversed the decision. See Associated Press, Judge Makes Bonds Pay Full Family
Support, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1994, § 3, at 2.
41
See id.
39
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Let me start off by saying that I’ve got tenure, so I can do this.
I expect never to appear in front of this judge, hopefully at least not
as a defendant.
The rule in question is not one I’m particularly a fan of.42 In
fact, if I were the czar of the NFL, I think I would probably have a
different rule. But I have to tell you, I’m not an expert on the
game of football. I don’t know at what age most players’ bodies
become sufficiently developed so that they’re able to successfully
compete in the NFL.43 I’m like most people, I’m a fan, and I have
my own completely uninformed, prejudiced decisions and
judgments; so I of course know the answer to everything. I know
what play the coach should run and what defense he should put on
the field. But the reality is I really don’t. And so I’m not going to
get into whether or not this is a good rule or a bad rule.
My instinct—particularly as a faculty athletic representative of
a Division One institution who would like to see all the Maurice
Clarett’s out of our system so that he’s not taking his oral exams
anymore—is to have these people go and play professional ball
and leave college to real college students.44
So having said that, I’m not a big fan of this rule and I wish the
NFL would loosen up with it. I also have to say that my opinion
on that has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not it’s an
antitrust violation. And so, if you try to apply legal doctrine to this
case, I think that you can go through Judge Scheindlin’s opinion
and point by point show that she is just flat-out wrong.45
In fact, this opinion is sort of right out of the 1960s. Had she
written this in the 1960s, I would have said, “Well okay, that’s a
reasonable, plausible argument.” But for those of you who know
42
See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. XII (“If four seasons have not elapsed since the
player discontinued high school, he is ineligible for selection, but may apply to the
Commissioner for special eligibility.”); see also Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385–87.
43
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (stating the NFL’s position that an athlete must
be three years out of high school to be eligible to play in the league).
44
Cf. Mike Fish, Where is the Outrage, Feb. 3, 2003, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside_game/mike_fish/news/2003/02/03/straight_shooting (commenting on the
inherent unfairness of allowing athletes to circumvent individual universities’ admissions
standards).
45
See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
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antitrust law, if you can see a district judge who starts citing as
authority for her decision United States v. Topco Assocs.,46 Klor’s
v. Broadway-Hale Department Stores,47 and a concurring opinion
from a 1949 Second Circuit decision that was reversed by the
Supreme Court,48 you know she’s in trouble. Let’s go through
some of the stuff that came out.
First of all, Judge Scheindlin rejected the labor exemption.49 I
want to just make a comment about David’s remarks, and I
appreciate David’s walking through the background of the labor
exemption.50 The one thing he left outand I know it’s because
he and I disagree on this oneis whether or not you have to have
union agreement in order for the non-statutory labor exemption to
apply.51 This was a contentious issue from the early 1970s until
1996. The two different sides disagreed quite vehemently. The
cases evolved.
But in 1996, by an 8-1 vote, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the non-statutory labor exemption applies to all matters
that are mandatory subjects of bargaining, whether or not the union
has agreed to them— the matters don’t have to be in a collective
bargaining agreement in order for the non-statutory labor
exemption to apply.52
That was precisely the issue in the Brown case, which involved
the NFL’s $1000-a-week salary cap on the developmental squad
players.53 The union had never agreed to it.54 The League had
proposed and unilaterally implemented the salary cap.55 The union
was against it.56 Mr. Brown, who was one of the developmental
46

405 U.S. 596 (1972)
359 U.S. 207 (1957).
48
See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring).
49
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
50
See supra notes 14–39 and accompanying text.
51
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (observing that the non
statutory labor exception is neither limited by case law nor principle to apply strictly to
labor management agreements or labor management consents).
52
See id. at 250–51.
53
See id.
54
See id. at 234–35.
55
See id. at 234–35 (1996).
56
See id. at 234.
47
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players, brought an antitrust suit.57 The case ultimately ended up
in the Supreme Court after the District of Columbia Circuit
decided 2-1 that it didn’t matter whether the union had agreed to
the cap or not; if it’s a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
remedy for members of the bargaining unit is through collective
bargaining created by the labor laws and not through an antitrust
court.58 How can you be bargaining in good faith if you’re out
suing the guy on the other side of the bargaining table in the
antitrust courts?59 That was essentially what the Supreme Court
said in 1996.60 So it is really not relevant in Clarett whether or not
the union had agreed to this “three years out of high school” rule or
not.61
Judge Scheindlin gave three reasons why the labor exemption
did not apply. Number one, she said that a provision setting entry
requirements into the bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.62 I’ve created for purposes of trying to add a little
levity to programs like this what I call my “stupidity assessment
scale.” It goes from one to five. One is “I disagree with it but it’s
not really stupid,” and there are different gradations up to five,
which is “this is really phenomenally stupid.” This one gets a five.
I don’t think there is anybody on this panelin fact, I have not
talked to anybody who is a labor lawyerwho would agree that
entry requirements are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.63 So
that reason is just gone.
Second, she said that the exemption cannot bar someone who is
not yet a member of the union from bringing a suit.64 Well, that’s
just a fancy way of saying it’s not a mandatory subject of
bargaining; if the union could agree to a provision that sets entry
requirements, then that collective bargaining agreement is going to
57
See id. at 235. In May 1990, 235 developmental squad players, including Mr.
Brown, brought an antitrust suit against the NFL and its member clubs. Id.
58
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S.
231 (1996) .
59
See Brown, 518 U.S. at 242.
60
Id.
61
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
62
See id. at 391–95.
63
See Jeff Darlington, In the Balance, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Feb. 10, 2004, at D1.
64
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395–96.
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apply to anyone who is or wants to become a member of the
bargaining unit.65 The collective bargaining agreement doesn’t
just apply to current members of the unit; it applies to prospective
members of the unit, which is what Clarett is.66 So essentially, this
second reason is just a rewording of “it’s not a mandatory subject
of bargaining.” So again, it’s not a very legitimate point.
The third argument Judge Scheindlin made I have to say a little
bit more about.67 In the third one, she said that for a rule to be
protected by the labor exemption, it must arise out of the collective
bargaining process.68 In other words, the rule has to be something
that, for example, the union and management actually had
discussed and management unilaterally implemented after impasse.
There is language in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme
Court’s decision in 1996, from which you could make Judge
Scheindlin’s third argument.69 And so I don’t think this one is
completely off the wall. It is quite clear that the NFL had the rule
regarding eligibility requirements long before the union ever took
any interest in it.70 In fact, it had a rule “four years out of high
school” before we even had a union.71 So one could argue that this
rule did not arise out of collective bargaining and that the language
in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. means that the labor exemption
shouldn’t apply.72
I don’t think that’s a good argument and I would disagree with
it, but I don’t think it’s completely off the wall. The reason I don’t
agree with it here is that it puts form over substance.73 The only
reason the eligibility rule was not bargained over is because the

65

See Darlington, supra note 63.
See id.
67
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
68
See id.
69
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
70
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385; see also Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C.
McKinnon, Professional Football’s Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the
Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 377 (1984) (tracing the origin of the Rule to 1925).
71
See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 70, at 377–78.
72
See Charles Lane, Clarett Lines Up against NFL, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2004, at D6.
73
See id.; see also Lynn Zinser, Court Bars Clarett from Draft for Now, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2004, at D1.
66

PANEL II FORMAT

404

4/1/2005 5:55 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:391

union didn’t have any problem with it.74 In fact, Gene Upshaw has
publicly stated he doesn’t have any problem with this rulein fact,
he supports it.75
So the fact that the union and the NFL didn’t argue over
eligibility in collective bargaining is really meaningless.76 All this
means is that the next time we have collective bargaining, the NFL
is going to have to insist that Mr. Upshaw argue with them for a
little bit before they agree on eligibility requirements.77 And if
that’s what the law is, it’s kind of silly. But that was Judge
Scheindlin’s third reason for rejecting the non-statutory labor
exemption.78
So I think the non-statutory labor exemption ought to apply.
The first two reasons Judge Scheindlin gave for why it did not
apply were just dumb. The third one is arguable, but I disagree
with it.
The next issue raised was the standing issue.79 On this one, I
disagree with the NFL. The NFL’s argument was that Clarett
didn’t have standing because he wasn’t injured by reason of that
which allegedly made the rule an antitrust violation.80 It’s a
somewhat technical antitrust doctrine that I don’t want to
particularly get into, but I think that it’s wrong.
I think that the allegation ought to beand I’m not sure it
wasthat what arguably made this illegal under the antitrust laws
is that by excluding from the talent playing football in the National
Football League a group of highly talented people, you are
somehow diminishing the quality of the product on the field—you
are keeping people off the field or off the court that the consumer
wants to see, and that by excluding them from playing, you are
74
Todd Jones, Players Union against Early Entry, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2004,
at 5F; see also Zinser, supra note 73.
75
See Darlington, supra note 63 (quoting Gene Upshaw as saying, “We will do
everything in our power to block these young players from entering the league.”).
76
See Charles Lane & Mark Maske, Judge Rules NFL Draft Is Open to Everyone,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at A1.
77
See id.
78
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
79
See id. at 397–98.
80
Id. at 398.
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diminishing the quality of the product—and product quality is one
of those values that antitrust law is trying to promote.
And so I think Clarett could make the argument that he is in
fact injured by reason of a rule that creates this adverse effect on
consumer welfare. So I’m not sure I would have granted the
NFL’s argument on the standing issue.
But in the process of rejecting it, Judge Scheindlin didn’t just
make the argument I made; she went on to say some things again
that were just flat-out off the wall.
For example, Judge Scheindlin says: Well, there were three
older cases from back in the 1970sHaywood v. NBA,81 Boris v.
United States Football League,82 and Linseman v. World Hockey
Ass’n83where courts had found a per se violation of the antitrust
laws against rules that are roughly equivalent to the one we are
talking about here with respect to the NBA, the USFL, and the
World Hockey Association.84 Judge Scheindlin said that because
those courts ruled on the merit, presumably they must have been
satisfied that the plaintiffs had standing.85
I mean that’s just silly. The defendants in those cases didn’t
raise the standing issue; there’s nothing in the opinions that spoke
to standing.86 To use that as some kind of precedent that standing
exists is, I think, just crazy.
Judge Scheindlin then cited Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale
Department Stores,87 which is a case from 1959 that the Supreme
Court has done everything short of expressly overruling. She
basically said: this is a group boycott, and therefore he has
standing.88 Again, I don’t want to get into the details of group
boycott doctrine, but there is not much left to it, and Klor’s is not a
81

401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
No. 83 CV 4980, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
83
439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
84
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390, 398.
85
See, e.g., id. at 398 n.119.
86
See id.
87
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
88
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 399 (holding that “group boycotts . . . have long
been held in the forbidden category” and that Clarett’s exclusion was an “injury flowing
directly from the anticompetitive effect of the Rule”).
82
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viable case to be citing for much of anything anymore—yet that’s
what she relied on.89
I could go through several of the statements she made, but I’d
rather focus on the antitrust issues.
I disagree with Judge Scheindlin’s analysis under the antitrust
laws for many reasons, but there are a couple mistakes she made
that are just glaring.
She held that summary judgment was appropriate.90 I am not
convinced that if this case were to go to a rule of reason trial before
a jury, that Clarett wouldn’t win. I think that a jury could balance
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and ultimately
conclude that the anticompetitive effects outweighed the
procompetitive benefits. My guess is, having not heard all the
evidence and all the experts, that if I were a juror, I would
probably not find that way, but I don’t know. I’d want to hear the
evidence before I reached that conclusion. But for the judge to
grant summary judgment is just goofy, because in order to do it she
had to make a couple of findings that are just inconsistent with
antitrust law today.
First, on the finding of anticompetitive effects, instead of
putting that issue to a jury, Judge Scheindlin declared that one
could use the “quick look rule of reason” approach, which is
certainly a doctrine that has been adopted by the Supreme Court in
various cases, starting with Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma v. NCAA.91 She said that the anticompetitive effects
were obvious, and the reason that they were obvious is because
Clarett was being denied the opportunity to pursue his profession.92
Well, that’s not an obvious anticompetitive effect. There is
language in the cases back in the 1950s and 1960s, when populist
antitrust views were very common, that might agree. However,
89

See id.
See id. at 410–11.
91
707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983); see Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 407–08 (providing
that a “quick look” analysis is appropriate where “the great likelihood of anticompetitive
effects can easily be ascertained,” and “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would
have an anticompetitive effect”).
92
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409–10.
90
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since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has rewritten Section 1
antitrust doctrine.93 The fact that an employee is somehow not
allowed to ply his trade is not the kind of thing that antitrust law is
interested in.94 Antitrust law is interested in consumer welfare; it’s
not interested in the rights of employees.95 That’s why we have
other laws, such as the labor laws.96
So the mere fact that an employee is excluded from being able
to work is not an antitrust issue.97 For Judge Scheindlin to say that
just because Clarett can’t work means that there is an
anticompetitive effect, and then to base summary judgment on this,
is just wrong.
Her support for this theory was a quotation from a concurring
opinion in a 1949 case in the Second Circuit involving the baseball
antitrust exemption (which six years later the Supreme Court
rejected in the Toolson case98), in which Judge Hand basically said
the right to work is an antitrust issue and that denying someone the
right to work, in that case in the context of the baseball lifetime
reserve system, was obviously anticompetitive.99 In 1949 I might
have agreed with that analysis. In 2004 it’s just absolutely wrong.
But what really perturbs me is Judge Scheindlin’s response to
the NFL’s procompetitive defense, in which she invokes an old
doctrine that goes back four or five decades . . . . The NFL’s
procompetitive defense, which a jury should evaluate and balance
against the anticompetitive effects, is that one of the reasons it has
this rule is because if it doesn’t, a lot of kids who would be future
NFL stars if they stayed in college and developed sufficient
maturity, will now come out prematurely, they will try to become
professionals before they are ready, and these kids will get eaten
up and spit out and will never be able to develop into the quality of

93

See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 181–84 (3d ed. 2004).
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that any challenge to an
employer’s hiring criteria must “be founded on labor rather than antitrust law”) (citing
Caldwell v. NBA, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995)).
98
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
99
Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring).
94
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NFL player that exists with the rule, and therefore in the long run
the quality of the NFL’s product will be diminished.100
Now, you might think that’s a silly argument; you might think
that’s a good argument. Like I said, I don’t really know because
my opinion is only informed from watching games on Sunday
afternoon. But whether it’s a good view or a bad view is a factual
issue, and it’s a factual issue that a jury has to decide.
Judge Scheindlin got rid of that issue in this case by saying it’s
irrelevant.101 The quality of the NFL’s product and the efficiency
with which the NFL produces its product are irrelevant because the
relevant market that is being benefited by this rule if the NFL is
right is the product market, whereas Maurice Clarett is claiming
that the anticompetitive effects are in the labor market, and you
can’t use benefits in the product market if the claimed injury is in
the labor market.102
Judge Scheindlin cites Topco,103 which is one of the most
vilified and ridiculed cases in the history of antitrust
jurisprudenceevery court in the country no longer recognizes it
as good lawand that’s her authority for this.104 It’s obviously not
a correct statement on her part that the product market is irrelevant
if the restraint is in the labor market.
As an example, in the NCAA cases the courts are
unanimousthe Supreme Court in the Board of Regents105 case
said sothat with respect to restraints on players and all these
amateurism rules, if you bring an antitrust suit alleging that the
NCAA’s rules on the players are anticompetitive in the player
labor market, these rules are nevertheless okay under the antitrust
laws because the NCAA’s product is defined by the amateur nature
of the activity, and therefore the benefit to consumers of having
amateur college football played by real students is such a

100
101
102
103
104
105

See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See id. at 409–10.
See id. at 409.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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procompetitive benefit in the product market that it overwhelms
any anticompetitive effects in the player labor market.106
I could name dozens of cases where since the mid-1970s the
courts have said that you have to balance the totality of the
competitive effects.107 About ten years ago in Sullivan v. NFL,108
the First Circuit reversed another trial judge who ruled that you
could only consider procompetitive effects in the market that the
plaintiff claims has anticompetitive effects.109 This is just not the
law.
And yet, Judge Scheindlin invokes the old Topco case for her
authority to grant summary judgment and take the procompetitive
benefits issue away from the jury.110 That’s just wrong, and I don’t
think there is any question about it.
Finally, she turns to the less-restrictive alternative doctrine and
says: Even if all of what I said before isn’t right, there is a lessrestrictive alternative in this case that the NFL could have
employed without barring all people who were three years out of
high school, and the less-restrictive alternative is that doctors could
give players medical and mental examinations to see if they were
ready to play in the NFL.111 I rest my case.
PROF. MOYER: Gary, one could only have hoped that you
would have told us what you really thought.
MR. FEHER: By the way, Jay, I want my neutral description of
the antitrust laws to not count against my time in responding to
Gary.
PROF. MOYER: Howard Ganz, what are you views on the
topic?
MR. GANZ: Although I usually agree 100 percent with Gary, I
have perhaps a minor disagreement today, but I’ll get there slowly.
106

Id. at 133–34.
See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, 812 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The Rule of
Reason requires the judge to balance the anti-competitive evils of a practice against its
procompetitive virtues.”).
108
See, e.g., Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1111–13 (1st Cir. 1994).
109
Id.
110
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
111
Id. at 410.
107

PANEL II FORMAT

410

4/1/2005 5:55 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:391

First, just a couple of personal observations. Discussing the
Clarett case is for me a little bit of a “déjà vu all over again,”
because when I was a junior—indeed very junior—associate at
Proskauer, I had the privilege of working on the Haywood case.112
My principal duty was to be the person who was sent to
Washington to file a petition in opposition to a motion for a stay in
the Supreme Court. So that was my maiden voyage other than as
an amicus, and my only voyage, to the Supreme Court of the
United States. And it was not a successful one because Justice
Douglas stayed the operation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the
NBA’s favor, and Mr. Haywood went on to a glorious NBA career
notwithstanding his tender age.113 So Clarett sort of brings me
back to the beginning.
I would acknowledge, Gary, that the phrase “sports law” may
be an oxymoron.114 I hope you don’t think “sports lawyer” is an
oxymoron as well, but we’ll let that go.
Like David Feher, today I am only presenting my personal
opinions. I don’t care if it’s adopted by the various players’
associations, although I doubt that it will be, and I have absolutely
no knowledge of the facts, so I can say whatever it is that I want to
say.
First, with respect to where Clarett is at the moment, I think it
is probably relevant to inform everybody that the NFL has made a
motion to stay Judge Scheindlin’s decision.115 I think that
argument is to be heard sometime next week by a panel that is to
consist of Judge Feinberg; Judge Cabranes, who was actually on
the panel in the NBA v. Williams case116 a few years ago; and
Judge Pooler.
If I were to put a wager on what will happen on the stay
motion, I think the court will grant a stay, because the NFL has
112

Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
Id. at 1207.
114
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
115
The NFL’s first motion for a stay was denied by Judge Scheindlin. See Clarett I, 306
F. Supp. 2d at 411. However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision on appeal. See
Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d. Cir. 2004). This appeal was heard by Circuit Judges Sack
and Sotomayor and District Judge Kaplan, sitting by designation. See id at 124.
116
NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
113
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proposed an expedited briefing schedule, that would enable the
court to decide the merits in relatively short order. Additionally,
the NFL has represented to the court that if it should affirm Judge
Scheindlin’s decision, the NFL would conduct a supplemental
draft in which Mr. Clarett could be selected in plenty of time for
him to attend training camp and/or to play next season.117
I agree, more seriously, with Gary’s analysis of Judge
Scheindlin’s opinion.118 Maybe a little bit on the lighter side of
thatand recognizing that I am one who practices in the Southern
District of New York and so therefore will be somewhat more
restrained than Professor Roberts from Tulanebut Judge
Scheindlin’s opinion is like virtually ever other opinion in a “sports
law” case. That is, it attempts to introduce some humor by using
sports phrases or sports analogies, which 99.9 percent of the time
fall flat: “the argument got close to success but failed to cross the
goal line,” “they did not hit a home run with this contention,”
etc.119 And for someone who has practiced in this area for some
number of years, I don’t think I take it personally, but it seems, in
my opinion, to sort of belittle the arguments that you’re making
when courts and arbitrators utilize that kind of language.
Judge Scheindlin actually took this to somewhat of an extreme
by her repeated citations to such august legal authoritiesand I
don’t mean to offend anyone in the audienceas espn.com. In
fact, the stay papers the NFL has filed make some issue of this
because those citations suggest that the Court may have
considered, and relied on, information that was outside the
record.120
Where I disagree, at least slightly with Garynot with the
resultis that I think the subject of this rule, good or bad, is a
mandatory, or should be found to be a mandatory subject of
117

See Dan Lewis, Clarett Clarification Causes Catastrophe? (Apr. 20, 2004)
(acknowledging that any potential harm to Clarett would be lessened by the NFL’s
agreement to hold a supplemental draft if the appeals court later ruled in his favor),
http://www.footballproject.com/story.php?storyid=422.
118
See supra notes 44–111 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (“This case has progressed rapidly,
virtually rushing toward the goal line because of the imminence of the 2004 draft.”).
120
See id. at 386 n.33, 388 n.47.
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collective bargaining, although this may not be an open-and-shut
labor law issue. There are NLRB decisions, and court opinions
affirming them, which hold, for example, that the administration of
pre-employment drug tests to applicants for employment is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining.121 And employers in virtually all
industries other than professional sports would take the position,
probably across the board, that they do not want and should not be
required to bargain about how they treat applicants, or what the
eligibility rules are, but would, instead, assert that matters like this
are within a management’s prerogative.
There are, of course, cases that suggest a different result. One
line of cases, on which the Wood decision in the Second Circuit
relied, held that a hiring hall, where individuals seeking
employment go to the hiring hall and then get referred out to
employers, is clearly a mandatory subject of bargaining.122 There
is an argument distinguishing hiring halls from a professional
sports league draft because indeed hiring halls are common in
industries where there are typically large or frequent layoffs of
peoplee.g., the construction industryand where an employee is
laid off, that employee can get back to work only by going to the
hiring hall.123 So when the union and employer are discussing how

121

See Star Tribune v. Newspaper Guild of the Twin Cities, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 548
(1989) (ruling that pre-employment drug testing, in and of itself, is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the statutory duty to bargain about employees’ terms and
conditions of employment).
122
See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing generally Local 357,
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.R.B.
409, enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966)).
Collective agreements in a number of industries provided for the exclusive referral of
workers by a hiring hall to particular employers at a specified wage. The Wood court
held that:
[T]he choice of employer is governed by the rules of the hiring hall, not the
preference of the individual worker. There is nothing that prevents such
agreements from providing that the employee either work for the designated
employer at the stipulated wage or not be referred at that time. Otherwise, a
union might find it difficult to provide the requisite number of workers to
employers. Such an arrangement is functionally indistinguishable from the
college draft.
Id.
123
See id. (explaining hiring halls).
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the hiring hall operates, it really has an effect, or potential effect,
on a current employee.124
All that being said, and while Judge Scheindlin tried to
distinguish the Wood case principally on the ground that Mr.
Clarett had not yet been drafted, I think that is a distinction without
merit, to put it mildly.125 It can’t make a difference that on the day
before the NFL draft, eligibility is not a mandatory subject, but as
soon as the Commissioner announces that Maurice Clarett has
been selected by Team X, eligibility became a mandatory subject.
That just does not seem to be a logical conclusion.
In addition, and certainly in other sports where there is an
express provision in a collective bargaining agreement, Judge
Scheindlin’s opinion really would eradicate rules to which the
bargaining parties themselves have agreed.126 For example, there
are age restrictions in the WNBA collective bargaining agreement,
directly bargained across the table; the agreement between the
WNBA and the Players Association says flat-out that you’ve got to
be twenty-two years old to play in the WNBA.127 Under Judge
Scheindlin’s opinion, those are pretty questionable provisions.
I think that’s wrongthat when there has clearly been
bargaining and the parties have agreed on issues like these, courts
should not, and will not, have a problem.
And I certainly agree with Gary that the fact that there is no
explicit language on an issue in a collective bargaining agreement
is not determinative. Labor law acknowledges that by the practice
of the parties over time, a course of conduct can emerge and
become binding on the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.128 A classic example: If the employer for twenty years
124

See id.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393–94 (distinguishing Wood, 809 F.2d 954).
126
See generally id.
127
See Kids in the NBA, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at C16 (providing that “[t]o be
drafted for a WNBA team, a player must be 22 during the calendar year of the first
season or graduated from a four-year college or have played at least two seasons in
another pro basketball league.”).
128
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 199 v. United Tel. Co. of
Fla., 738 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an arbitrator’s award that
appeared contrary to a collective bargaining agreement might nevertheless have been
125
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has given Christmas turkeys to the workforce, taking away those
turkeys may be a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
even if that agreement says nothing about turkeys.
So too in the NFL, these rules about eligibility have existed for
quite some time, there has never been any objection from the
union, and they should be regarded as a matter of practice as part
of the overall collective bargaining agreement.
In addition, there are social issues and business issues involved
in rules like this. By social issue I really don’t mean what Gary
was saying about having a panel of doctors examining high school,
junior high school, or elementary school athletes to see whether or
not they are capable of playing a professional sportI’m not
talking about whether or not the kids can play or whether or not the
kids are mature enough to act in appropriate ways either on the
court, or off the court. There are plenty of examples of
professional athletes in their thirties who have acted in rather
childish ways—and I don’t think we need to make a long list of
those—so I’m not sure age is a necessary factor.129
But there are thousands of athletessome at college, some
notwho, heartened by the ruling in Clarettand I think seven or
eight high school players have declared themselves eligible for the
NFL draftare going to give up the opportunity for an education
to go to play a professional sport in which they are never going to
succeed.130 For every one who makes it, there are thousands who
don’t.131 Terminating the three season eligibility rule exacerbates
the problem.132
From a more parochial business side, i.e., from the League and
teams’ point of viewand there may be some NBA draft picks

valid if premised upon reliable evidence of the parties’ intent, such as past practices,
industrial efficiency, and bargaining history).
129
But see Easterblogg, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2004) (“Performance in team
sports requires maturity, which in this context usually means the early twenties. Football
is also the most complex of sports; it simply takes longer to learn.”), at
http://tnr.com/easterbrook.mhtml?pid=1296.
130
See, e.g., Dick Vitale, High-School Stars Way Too High on NBA (Feb. 6, 2004), at
http://espn.go.com/dickvitale/vcolumn040206-high-schoolers.html.
131
See id.
132
See id.
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that reflect this because I think it is more important in sports like
basketball where there is only a minimal number of draft
choicesthere obviously have been a number of players who have
been very successful coming out of high school and playing in the
NBA.133 Putting aside his other problems, Kobe Bryant isn’t a bad
basketball player and neither is Kevin Garnett, but for every
Bryant and Garnett there are question marks.134
At least from a very narrow business perspective, a team takes
a large risk in investing one of its very few options to select draft
choices by selecting someone who is eighteen or nineteen years
old.135 They may win; they may lose.136 From the business
perspective, it would be much better if that individual had more
seasoning, whether in college or in some minor league, etc.137
That is actually one of the reasons why the NBA started the
National Basketball Development League, which has had some
modest amount of success in providing call-ups to the NBA.138
I think that, Jay, concludes what I would say for the moment.
PROF. MOYER: Thank you, Howard.
Let’s hear from David Cornwell.
MR. CORNWELL: Thank you, Jay.
I am going to, like Gary, take some specific shots at the
Judge’s opinion.
I actually think this is a fascinating case because it gives us the
opportunity to get a glimpse at the impact that litigation tactics
133
See id. (“Let’s hope that some of these kids re-think and re-evaluate their futures.
They can’t all be the next LeBron James.”).
134
See, e.g., Keith A. Owens, The Wags Try Kobe (July 30, 2003) (Despite Bryant’s
success on the court, “he was the youngest player ever to join the NBA in 1996 at age 17.
Now, at age 24, he may become one of the youngest to lose it all. . . . [He] has probably
been caught up in too much of a whirlwind at far too young an age. Being a sports hero,
role model and husband has got to be one hell of a load to shoulder for a 19-year-old.”),
at http://www.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=5191.
135
See Vitale, supra note 130.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
See Nat’l Basketball Dev. League, 15 Former NBDL Players on 2004–05 NBA
Opening Day Rosters (Nov. 2, 2004), at http://www.nba.com/nbdl/nbdl/nbdl_nba_openingroster_04.html.
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have on the outcome of a case, as well as confirming that, in fact,
there are times when judges are just flat-out wrong.139
With respect to litigation tactics, I’m quite certain that there
were good reasons the lawyers for the NFL and NFLPA decided
not to issue a clarification to the collective bargaining agreement
when it became clear that Maurice Clarett was going to challenge
the draft eligibility rules.140
The collective bargaining agreement in the NFL is also an
element of a stipulated settlement agreement that came about in the
resolution of a series of antitrust cases arising out of the labor
dispute in the NFL in the late 1980s and early 1990s.141 Since the
collective bargaining agreement was adopted, there have been a
series of clarifications between the union and the league that, in my
opinion, actually add new provisions—even though they are
characterized as clarifications—and it seems to me that the parties
could have clarified the eligibility rule here. Had they, I don’t
think that this case would have gotten much further, because in that
instance it would have been a case of contract interpretation and
not necessarily one that was susceptible to antitrust scrutiny.
Additionally, I think that had they issued that clarification, the
NFL would have done well to move the case to the District Court
in Minneapolis because Judge Doty has a long history of dealing
with these parties and disputes arising out of the collective
bargaining agreement.142 I have been involved in disputes with the
NFL and the NFLPA relating to interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.143 My experience with Judge Doty is that
139
Judge Scheindlin’s ruling was overturned by the Second Circuit. See Clarett II, 369
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
140
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
141
For a brief summary of the antitrust cases, see Steven Wayne Hays, Labor Strife in
the National Football League, Why the Reggie White Settlement Was Unfairly Settled for
Those Involved and Why This Settlement Will Eventually Lead to More Problems, 13 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 203–12 (1996).
142
Judge David S. Doty oversees the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement. In 1992,
Judge Doty paved the way for free agency in the NFL in overseeing a case finding the
league’s free agent policies to be in violation of federal antitrust laws. See McNeil v.
NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
143
Mr. Cornwell served as Assistant General Counsel for the NFL earlier in his career.
In 1997, he co-founded DNK Cornwell, which specializes in complex transactions in the
sports and entertainment industry.

PANEL 2

2005]

4/1/2005 5:55 PM

MAURICE CLARETT’S CHALLENGE

417

when the NFL and the NFLPA agree on a provision, or on the
interpretation of a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, he is unlikely to agree with a third party’s competing
interpretation.144
With respect to the Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, I think that the
Judge got it wrong in a number of areas.
First, I don’t think this case was susceptible to summary
judgment.145 As we know, the standard for summary judgment is
that there is no material fact relating to an issue in the case when
all of the facts are construed in favor of the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment.146 Peter Ruocco, someone with
whom Jay and I worked at the NFL, submitted a declaration in
support of the NFL’s position where he stated that the eligibility
rule was in fact the subject of collective bargaining.147 In rejecting
the applicability of the non-statutory exemption, the court found
that there was no evidence that the rule was addressed in collective
bargaining.148 That means that Judge Scheindlin specifically
rejected a factual assertion by a witness in the case without any
finding that the factual statement was for some reason
inadmissible.149 So in that regard, I think she is flat-out wrong.
A couple of observations about the non-statutory exemption.
The Judge even states in her opinion that the mandatory
subjects are wages, hours, other conditions of employment, and
those matters intimately related to the mandatory subjects of
bargaining.150 I don’t know that there is any analysis, strained or
otherwise, that supports the conclusion that if the draft is a subject
of mandatory bargaining, eligibility for the draft wouldn’t also be a

144

Id.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
146
See id. at 389.
147
Mr. Ruocco is the Senior Vice-President of Labor Relations of the NFL Management
Council and was personally involved in the 1993 collective bargaining with the NFLPA.
See id. at 383 n.4.
148
See id. at 396.
149
See id.
150
Id. at 392–93.
145
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mandatory subject under her own language of “matters intimately
related” to those subjects.151
Howard noted the Judge’s effortI don’t even think it
qualifies as being an effortto distinguish Wood.152 Wood stands
for the proposition that in collective bargaining, a union may agree
to provisions that have an impact on prospective members of the
bargaining unit.153 You cannot find any language in Wood that
supports the distinction that someone is not a prospective member
pre-draft but is post-draft.154
Similarly, the court cited a case, Caldwell v. American
Basketball Ass’n, and attempted to distinguish that by saying:
“Caldwell addresses a mandatory subject of bargaining—namely
the conditions under which an employer may terminate an
employee.”155 Here I think the distinction is of little difference. If
an employer can terminate an employee, or if termination is
insulated from an antitrust challenge, then so too is a decision
whether to hire an employee. I don’t see it as a distinction that
makes much of a difference.
But one thing I do credit the Judge withand not so much the
Judge, but it’s a conspiracy of events in my viewis that I think
the decision holds up, to a certain degree, because of the absence
of the NFLPA’s perspective and a definitive statement that the
eligibility rule was, in fact, incorporated into the collective
bargaining agreement.156 The NFL’s interests were laid out in the
case, but there are clear interests that the union would have in
agreeing to an eligibility rule, two of which come to mind readily.
One is where an employer has access to less skilled, and
therefore less expensive, employees, then a union has an interest in
ensuring that those employees are required to meet certain
qualifications, i.e., eligibility rules. So in that instance, I think the
NFLPA had an interest in agreeing to the eligibility rule.
151

See id.
See id. at 393–94 (citing Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d. Cir. 1987).
153
See Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
154
See id.
155
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 394–95 (citing Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n,
66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir. 1995)).
156
See supra notes 26–39 and accompanying text.
152
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A second would be if the union accepted, as I doI do believe
that the rule is good because a substantial portion of my
professional life is now spent dealing with and representing
professional athletesthat it is fair to conclude that certain young
men lack both the physical and psychological maturity to be
successful in the NFL.157 I am hard pressed to embrace an
argument that says these young men have the right to fail, and
that’s what I think the challenge to the eligibility rule ultimately
does.158 But if you accept the notion that young athletes are not
physically mature enough, and ultimately are therefore susceptible
to more injury, then the NFLPA has an interest in restricting those
individuals’ access to the NFL because that would have a chilling
effect on things such as benefits, injuries, and things of that
nature.159
One other observation, following on what Howard said: I was
stunned when I read the opinion. While I am as close to Michael
Wilbon as somebody can be without actually being related, I was
stunned to see that Judge Scheindlin actually cited Michael Wilbon
in connection with this case.160
That is just simply
inappropriate.161 I think that, in addition to being legally flawed,
the decision is unprofessional as well.
PROF. MOYER: Before we go to questions, do you want to
counterpoint?
MR. FEHER: I really haven’t discussed at all my personal
views on the decision.

157
Many critics and professional scouts, for example, have expressed concerns about
Maurice Clarett’s emotional maturity to play in the NFL. See, e.g., Sean Lahman,
Clarett’s Behavior Raises Questions (Feb. 3, 2004), http://www.footballproject.com/story.php?storyid=415.
158
See, e.g., Paul Daugherty, Clarett’s Loss May Be His Gain (Apr. 20, 2004), at
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/04/20/spt_sptfoot1daugherty.html.
159
See id.
160
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 n.54 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Michael
Wilbon, For Clarett, It’s a Bad Move, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at D1). In addition to
writing as a columnist for the Washington Post, Mr. Wilbon co-hosts ESPN’s Pardon the
Interruption with fellow Washington Post columnist Tony Kornheiser.
161
See generally John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S.
Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002) (discussing the increasing use of
non-legal materials in the High Court’s decisions).
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MR. GANZ: That’s okay, David.
MR. FEHER: You can tell that when Howie and I negotiate,
we’re on opposite sides of the table. When Gary and I have a
dispute, it’s pretty much the same too.
I want to look at this very carefully, though, because I think it
is very easy—when you sometimes have an opinion where judges
get interested in sports cases and use sports clichés and all of
that—to totally dismiss it and say, “Oh, it’s just not right.”162 I
don’t like that. The judges succumb every now and then.
Everyone’s a fan to some degree, I guess.
But leaving that language aside, I think it’s important to
analyze it very carefully, in terms of what the opinion says and
what it doesn’t say, and also to break it out because I think Judge
Scheindlin got large chunks of this right.
On the antitrust law, I will say that Gary and I just
fundamentally disagree on all sorts of subjects, and we have done
this for years; there’s no reason to stop disagreeing now.
But let’s look at it piece by piece and see what the judge found,
what it’s based upon, and whether or not it makes sense.
There are really two fundamental questions here. The first is
whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies or doesn’t
apply, and then second, if it doesn’t apply, what are the antitrust
merits?163
Let’s start with the first part: Does the non-statutory labor
exemption apply? The facts that Judge Scheindlin found are not
that the union and the employer agreed on these restrictions.164 Let
me just go over factually what is uncontested and undisputed, and
also what the judge found the effect was.
If you look at the NFL collective bargaining agreement, there
is what’s called a “non-suit” provision, which says that the NFLPA
and its members will not file suit concerning the NFL constitution
and by-laws.165
162
163
164
165

See supra notes 40–41, 118–119 and accompanying text.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390–91.
See id. at 396–97.
See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. IV, § 2.
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In terms of how that provision applies to Mr. Clarett, one
interesting thing is that Maurice Clarett, since he hasn’t joined the
NFL and actually hasn’t been drafted yet, isn’t a “member” of the
NFLPA.166 If the definition of the membership of the NFLPA had
been drafted differently, to not only include players who have been
drafted but players who are seeking to be drafted, the NFL might
have had a good and interesting argument that Mr. Clarett was
barred by that agreement from even prosecuting the litigation in
the first instance.167 But when you examine the collective
bargaining agreement and see who it defines to be part of the unit,
Mr. Clarett happens to be just outside that boundary.168
PROF. MOYER: David, let me ask you one question. What’s
the scope of the NFLPA’s certification?
MR. FEHER: Actually it’s interesting because the NFLPA
gave up its status as a collective bargaining unit, and then they held
that there was never a union that was certified, subject to a letter
from the NLRB saying “this is the scope of your bargaining
unit.”169 That sometimes happens with a union election, but there
wasn’t a union election trigger here. There were just consent
forms that were distributed among the membership after the
antitrust settlement was resolved, where the various union
members agreed that they wanted to re-form the union.170
And so, in terms of the scope of the union itself, the scope of
the bargaining unit is defined on the first page of the collective
bargaining agreement.171 I think that’s partly what got Mr. Clarett
166

See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.
Id.
168
See NFL CBA, supra note 32, Preamble (stating that the agreement covers present
and future employee players, specifically: “1. All professional football players employed
by a member club of the National Football League; 2. All professional football players
who have been previously employed by a member club of the National Football League
who are seeking employment with an NFL Club; 3. All rookie players once they are
selected in the current year’s NFL College Draft; and 4. All undrafted rookie players
once they commence negotiation with an NFL Club concerning employment as a
player.”).
169
See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Minn.
1991).
170
See Jon Saraceno, NFL Players Prepare to Recertify as a Union, USA TODAY, Mar.
5, 1993, at 11C.
171
See NFL CBA, supra note 32.
167
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in the courthouse door in the first step. He has argued in all the
appellate papers that he is not a member of the NFLPA.172 So that
gets to the first step.
But then you get to the question of what was agreed to and
what wasn’t agreed to. As I said in the introduction, you can’t
open up the CBA and find a section that says “eligibility
requirements.”173 There are just these provisions that refer to nonsuits with respect to the constitution and bylaws.174
And then, at the same time the CBA was agreed to, there was a
letter agreement that was separately executed which simply says,
“Attached hereto is the constitution and bylaws of the NFL that’s
referred to in this other provision.”175 And so that letter agreement
doesn’t say, “We agree to everything that’s in here;” it just says,
“This is what’s cross-referenced in the other provision.”176
And then, when you open up the provision of the constitution
and bylaws of 1993, which is just cross-referenced, there is a
provision relating to college eligibility.177 But those are the rules
that were in place in 1993.178
Judge Scheindlin said: Well, the reason why the NFL doesn’t
get any benefit out of those rules is because by the time you got to
Mr. Clarett, it wasn’t the same provisions, it wasn’t exactly the
1993 provisions, and the rules restricting Mr. Clarett were actually
just a memorandum unilaterally issued by Commissioner
Tagliabue; therefore, it didn’t come within whatever protection
might otherwise exist if the facts were different.179
Now, I’m not going to get into the facts, but I will say that I do
believe that it makes a fundamental difference as to whether or not
a restriction that is imposed by a multi-employer bargaining group
172
Cf. Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Clarett, however, argues that the
eligibility rules are an impermissible bargaining subject because they affect players
outside of the union.”).
173
See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.
174
See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. IV, § 2.
175
See, e.g., Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 128.
176
See id.
177
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385, 396 n.110 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
178
See id. at 385–86.
179
See id. at 386–87, 396.
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or a group of employers is or is not agreed to by a union either
directly or by incorporation by reference; there’s a fundamental
difference under the labor laws as to what employers can do as part
of the bargaining process and what they can do unilaterally on their
own.180
I’ll go one step further. Let’s assume that Donald Trump
wakes up tomorrow and decides, “I have enough money now so
I’m going to resurrect my mistake with the United States Football
League and I’m going to form a new league, and this league will
compete against the NFL, and we’ll form this new league and we’ll
structure it in a certain way.”181
The NFL looks at this and says: I don’t like that, and so what I
am going to do is to unilaterally decide . . . I don’t need to talk to
Gene Upshaw or anyone else. Commissioner Tagliabue wakes up
on one of his bad days and says, “I’m going to unilaterally decide,
and we’re going to issue a memo that says if any NFL team tries to
hire any player who at any point in his life was employed by this
competing league, they are forever barred from ever playing in the
National Football League. We’ve got to put these other guys out
of business because we don’t want this competition.” Now, that’s
not something that’s agreed to by the union but unilaterally
decided by the NFL.
MR. GANZ: This is during the term of an agreement?
MR. FEHER: Even during the term of an agreement.
MR. GANZ: Even during, okay.
MR. FEHER: During or in between. But in any event
MR. CORNWELL: He said he didn’t want to get into the
details.
MR. GANZ: I’m sorry.

180

See id. at 392–93.
See Thomas Neumann, Three and Out, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 16, 2003, at
C1 (tracing the history of the USFL); see also Matt Winkeljohn, Ready to Rumble,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 2, 2002, at 1D (“The United States Football League was
doing OK while playing in the spring, 1983–85. But when New Jersey Generals owner
Donald Trump persuaded fellow USFL owners to switch to a fall schedule opposite the
NFL in 1986, it spelled doom.”).
181
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MR. FEHER: This is a hypothetical.
But looking at this hypothetical, if one of those aggrieved
players said: “This is a classic group boycott. I was previously
employed in this other league. Now I want to join the NFL. This
is a classic group boycott that flat-out bars me from participation in
this league, not individually but because of my status, and that is a
violation of the antitrust laws.”182
Where does that stand in the spectrum of a labor dispute or
something that should properly be the subject of an antitrust suit?
This is a unilateral restriction imposed by somebody for
anticompetitive reasons, not as part of the bargaining process, not
as having anything to do with collective bargaining, but rather
because of an intent to suppress competition on a particular
marketand, indeed, more than one market.183
The point I’m trying to make here is that the distinctions
between the labor laws and the antitrust laws aren’t so broad and
aren’t so clear-cut as Gary suggested when he said that according
to the Supreme Court in Brown, the non-statutory labor exemption
applies to labor matters even in the absence of an agreement.184 It
doesn’t go that far.185
What Brown really decided, I think, when you look at the text,
is that when as part of collective bargaining the bargaining stops,
impasse is reached, and management unilaterally implements
something, which they are permitted affirmatively to do under the
labor laws in the collective bargaining process—and that unilateral
implementation is not distant in time or subject matter from what
was being negotiated—then in that instance, the absence of union
agreement wasn’t necessary for it to be exempt from antitrust
attack because implementation after impasse is a part of the labor
laws; if we’re going to have the labor laws operate, and that is
something that is clearly recognized under the labor laws, you

182
183
184
185

Cf. Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 398–405.
See id.
See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text.
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237–39 (1996).
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cannot have that exercise of labor law right by management as
something that’s subject to antitrust attack.186
That doesn’t mean the antitrust laws don’t apply.187 In fact, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the issue as to what happens if it
is much more distant in time from the bargaining or if the union
were to give up its status as a collective bargaining
representative.188 Those are different issues.
And so, while management might wish that the Brown decision
decided that the antitrust laws are not relevant anymore to labor
markets, they clearly are because it depends upon the factual
circumstances in which it arises.189 The point here is that on the
non-statutory labor exemption and the facts of this particular case,
if one assumes the factual findings by the court that this was
something never agreed to in collective bargaining and isn’t really
part of the collective bargaining process, I think you have a very,
very good argument that the antitrust laws can and should apply to
factual circumstances that are divorced from union consent, union
agreement, and bargaining in any sense.190
The issue that Howard raised in terms of practice is an
interesting one.191 That isn’t something that we’ve gotten into very
much, and we can talk about it later. But I don’t think that was the
subject of Scheindlin’s opinion and it hasn’t been briefed so far.192
Leaving aside the labor exemption, and if you get past the facts
and say that because this doesn’t have anything to do with
collective bargaining it was something that was unilaterally
implemented, therefore the antitrust law should apply
Before that though, there is a critical point that I think everyone
is in agreement with—Judge Scheindlin’s observation that
“Clarett’s eligibility was not the union’s to trade away.”193 My
view is that the decision is completely incorrect. If in the NBA or
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

See id.
See id. at 250.
See id.
See id.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See generally Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379.
See id. at 395–96.
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the WNBA the union and management want to agree upon who
can or cannot compete in the labor pool and who can or cannot end
up being a member of the union, I think the labor law precedents
are pretty clear that these issues can properly be the subject of
union-management agreement, and in that instance would be
protected from antitrust attack.194
If you were an electricians’ union and you agreed with
management that no one can come into the bargaining unit unless
he or she has passed a certified test by an independent third party
that he or she is competent to be an electrician, and somebody
says, “Well no, I should be able to compete in this labor market
and management can decide whether or not I’m a good enough
electrician by how many people I kill in the first year,” I think that
is properly a subject of bargaining and properly a subject of
potential agreement between management and labor.195 And if
they decide that you need to have a certificate to come in, then it is
protected from antitrust attack.196
And if in the future Gene Upshaw and Paul Tagliabue sat down
and each put their signature on a piece of paper that says “no more
college eligibility unless you meet these standards,” then that I
think ends the matter, plain and simple, because I think it is
something that can be agreed upon and can’t be subject to
collateral attack under the antitrust laws if there is an express
agreement.197
On the antitrust laws, once you get past the labor exemption,
you question: “If this is something that there isn’t any agreement
on, should it survive antitrust attack?”198
194

See Darlington, supra note 63 (According to Gary Roberts, “If General Motors and
the United Auto Workers wanted to reach an agreement that nobody can go to work until
they’re 24 years old, they can do that . . . . Employers and unions have these entry
requirements and collective-bargaining agreements all the time. It’s just so foolish she
would rule otherwise.”).
195
See id.
196
See id.
197
See Tony Grossi, NFL Awaits the Storm Clouds, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 6, 2004, at D1
(“Even if S[c]heindlin’s decision is upheld on appeal, the league could amend its
collective bargaining agreement with the players union to close the door just opened.”).
198
See Ron Borges, Clarett Ruled Eligible; NFL is Expected to Appeal Judge’s
Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2004, at E1.
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First, although those cases relating to eligibility rules have been
some time decidedthough those were the last time those rules
were challengedthe last time I looked under the antitrust laws, a
lot of doctrines that arose many years ago are still good law,
including per se rules on price fixing and per se rules on classic
group boycotts.199
It is true that the Supreme Court in contexts outside of classic
group boycotts has said that it has to be careful in terms of where
the per se rule is going to apply, but FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n 200 is a very recent Supreme Court decision . . . .
When the participants in that labor market said flat-out, “We are
not going to work anymore unless we have our wages
raised”those were lawyers who were working for indigent
clients who wanted to have their wages raised—the Supreme Court
said that this was a classic group boycott.201 They didn’t use those
exact words, but they said that it was subject to summary
condemnation without a full-blown rule of reason analysis, and I
actually believe it said that it was subject to per se condemnation
as a clear classic group boycott.202
The difficulty is whenever you are outside of a classic group
boycott and you get into other circumstances where the facts are a
little bit more mixedWhat are the motivations? What are the
interests? Is this a cooperative venture in other ways?that’s a
little bit different.203 But we’re not in one of those situations here
because Mr. Clarett said that this is a classic group boycott in that
the rules said “not just me” and it’s not just whether or not
Clarettif this was a rule that said “Maurice Clarett can’t compete
in this wage market,” then you properly get into the subject of
injury to a competitor versus injury to competition.204
But this is a rule that said “this entire class of potential
participants in the labor market is excluded from competing in this
199

KINTNER ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 11.24 (per se rules on price fixing),
48.14 (per se rules on classic group boycotts) (2004).
200
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
201
See id. at 431–32.
202
See id.
203
See id. at 432–36.
204
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98.
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market.”205 The question as to whether or not it is subject to per se
or “quick-look” review is a different matter.206 This isn’t an
individual exclusion; this is a group exclusion.207
I think the application of the “quick look,” or even the per se,
whenever you have a naked restraint of tradei.e. where an entire
class of potential market participants is not permitted to participate
in that marketthat I think is something that is very easily
susceptible to summary condemnation under either the per se or
the “quick look.”208
We’ve been talking about the NCAA cases.209 We’ve got a
case that is currently pending where the NCAA passed a ruleand
I know we all like the NCAA tournament in certain ways, but once
upon a time the NCAA had competitors where other tournaments
were out here, and indeed an even more prominent competitor, of
which Fordham was a participant, the NIT, which was a much
bigger tournament in the 1950s than the NCAA was.210 The
NCAA didn’t like that and didn’t like the competition. They
passed a rule that said: if you’re invited to the NCAA tournament,
you are not allowed to participate in any other post-season
tournament.211 That is a flat, summary, exclusionary rule, a group
boycott in its classic sense.212
That is currently pending.213 We are in summary judgment
arguments with the NCAA in terms of whether or not that is

205

See id. at 385–86.
See id. at 407–08.
207
See id. at 397–98.
208
See id. at 407–08.
209
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see
also supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
210
See Edward N. Matisik, NIT Sues NCAA under Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Feb. 4,
2005), at http://www.collegehoopsnet.com/specials/050204.htm; see also Second
Chances . . . But the NIT Offers Little More for NCAA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar.
15, 1990, at 6D (recounting the National Invitation Tournament’s illustrious past and its
current status as a bridesmaid to the immensely popular NCAA Tournament).
211
See Melissa Isaacson, Road to the Rockies, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1990, § 3, at 2.
212
See Metro Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment).
213
See Mark Alesia, NCAA Defends Tourney Bid Rules, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 16,
2004, at 1D.
206
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subject to either “quick look” or summary condemnation.214 And
all sorts of issueswhat is the relevant market, what is the effect
on competitionnone of that matters once you’re in a per se or
“quick look.”215 And when you get into circumstances where you
have flat-out naked restraints that are completely exclusionary on
their face, it gets into a different mode of analysis.216
And so while Judge Scheindlin’s language, I think, was not the
best at times, when you look at the authorities that she cited, I
actually think the antitrust analysis was not bad at all and follows
some relatively standard case law in this area.217
The only other thing I want to note is that in terms of whether
or not it is okay to justify a restriction in one market by
procompetitive benefits in another market, there are different
circumstances when you are looking at vertical integration and a
chain of distribution, and you’ve got dealers that are distributing a
product.218 That is one circumstanceclearly vertical factors in a
chain of distribution and a particular product—when you can look
at intrabrand competition versus interbrand competition and how
that should all apply in terms of the reasonableness of the restraint
under the antitrust law.219
It is a different situation when you are saying, “I am allowed to
restrain competition in my input market, in terms of what I buy to
214

See generally id.
See Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 407–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
216
See id.
217
See id. at 397–411; see also Damon Hack, Judge Orders N.F.L to Permit Young
Athletes to Enter Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A1. Robert A. McCormick, a law
professor at Michigan State University who also worked on Clarett’s behalf in the case
said, “She decided correctly that this is not the sort of thing exempted from antitrust law.”
Id.
218
JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS §
19.03 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the history of Supreme Court decisions concerning
vertical restraints on trade). In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
57–58 (1977), the Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions should be
evaluated under the rule of reason, and that such restraints may be justified if they
enhance interbrand competition between the manufacturer and its competitors, even if
there is some loss in intrabrand competition among the manufacturer’s distributors. See
id. Eleven years later, the Supreme Court, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 719 (1988), held that absent an express agreement on
price, vertical restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason. See id.
219
See id.
215
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create my product, in order to justify how well I can compete in
my output market.” If today any employerif GM said, “I’m
going to be better able to compete in the automobile market if
I”let’s say we don’t have a union hypothetically“if I agree
with every other participant in the auto market to fix the wages of
all the other employees in this wage market, and that restraint of
trade is justifiable because I am going to be able to compete better
in the output market”the antitrust laws do not go so far. There
are a lot more nuanced distinctions in terms of vertically integrated
enterprises with intrabrand and interbrand competition, and
whether or not these can serve as justifications.220 It’s completely
exclusionary conduct in one market because that’s part of your
input into a totally different market in which you’re competing.221
I do not believe that the antitrust laws go nearly so far. And
while management and the producers of these entertainment
products would like it to be so far, it is not so far right now.
And so while I think it’s easy to take shots at Judge Scheindlin,
other than her conclusion in terms of the NFL and NFLPA
couldn’t agree on it, I actually think that a lot of the rest of it
makes sense.
PROF. MOYER: I’m sure that there are at least two, and
possibly three, people on the panel who would just dearly love to
respond to that and would disagree with it, but I’m not going to let
that happen because we have a time problem.
I will say this. I think it’s clear from the views illustrated by
Gary’s approach and by David’s approach that this case does test
the limits of the so-called “modern” approach to antitrust, the
school that emphasizes consumer welfare as the touchstone of
violation or no violation, rather than the populist view that
prevailed prior to the 1970s.222 We’re going to see, if this case
keeps going and if the labor point is not the only point that gets
220

See id.
See id.
222
See VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 218, § 1.02 (In Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court stated that the objective of the
antitrust laws “rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress.”) (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 4).
221
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decided, just how viable that old school that David Feher is talking
about and embracing still is.223
MR. FEHER: By the way, Jay, just to be fair, I am not old
school.
PROF. MOYER: Old is sometimes good.
MR. FEHER: I am not old school. I think everything I have
said is perfectly compatible with the Chicago School.
PROF. MOYER: Well, there are a lot of people on the Chicago
School side who would disagree, and if we had another hour I
would turn you guys loose and it would be fascinating.
But let’s say this. In terms of the progress of this case, there
will come a point at which Maurice Clarett will be eligible for the
draft and will enter the NFL.224 If this case has not been decided at
the Second Circuit level, much less at the Supreme Court level, can
this case be kept alive, or will it become moot—will it at some
point no longer be a justiciable controversy? Who has a view on
that?
MR. CORNWELL: I think it will be kept alive because he is
not an individual defendant protecting his individual rights; he is
protecting or seeking to protect the rights of a class.225 I think
David made the observation about protecting impact on
competitors as opposed to impact on competition. So maybe it’s
not Maurice Clarett’s name, but ultimately there are similarly
situated individuals.226
223

See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 125 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (electing not to express an
opinion on the district court’s conclusion that Clarett alleged a sufficient antitrust injury
since they felt that that eligibility rules are indeed exempt from antitrust scrutiny under
the non-statutory labor exemption).
224
The Court of Appeals did eventually reverse the opinion of the district court. See id.
at 143. Previous to that decision, the court granted a stay of the district court’s decision.
As a result, Clarett remained ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft but will be eligible for the
draft in 2005. See Warren DeLuca, Maurice Clarett, http://www.houstonprofootball.com/draft/prospects/clarettm.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
225
See, e.g., Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating the issue in the
case as: “Should Clarett’s right to compete for a job in the NFL—the only serious pro
football game in town—trump the NFL’s right to categorically exclude a class of players
that the League has decided is not yet ready to play?”) (emphasis added).
226
For example, Mike Williams, a wide receiver out of U.S.C., entered the 2004 NFL
draft following the district court’s opinion in the Clarett case. This made Williams, as a
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PROF. ROBERTS: Why would his lawyers continue to churn
legal fees if he is already in the NFL? His lawyers represent him,
they don’t represent a class.
MR. FEHER: You know, Gary, I actually can speak to this
from a personal challenge I got at a prior symposium. I was out at
St. John’s the weekend after the Clarett decision came down with
Alan Milstein.227 We reviewed this, and I said unequivocally that
if Gene Upshaw and Paul Tagliabue were to agree to it, that would
be the end of the matter.228 Mr. Milstein said, “David, if you do
that, I will find another plaintiff and we will have another lawsuit.”
At that point, I said, “Alan, you can make that argument, but I
think under the labor laws you would lose.”
PROF. ROBERTS: Unless he gets Judge Scheindlin, of course.
MR. FEHER: I think under the labor laws, if there is such an
agreementI mean, we’ll see what the Second Circuit says, but I
think that on the point as to whether the union and management
can agree, that was clearly wrong.
PROF. MOYER: Speaking of the Second Circuit, we have in
the Second Circuitso far as I know, he’s still alive and active and
healthyJudge Ralph Winter.229
MR. FEHER: That’s correct.
PROF. MOYER: Judge Winter is a former professor of both
labor law and antitrust law at the Yale Law School.230 He has been
result of NCAA rules, ineligible to return to U.S.C. After the Court of Appeals ruling to
stay the district court’s opinion, and their subsequent reversal of that opinion in the
Clarett case, Williams, like Clarett, was declared ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft. Like
Clarett, he will most likely participate in the draft in 2005. See Warren DeLuca, Mike
Williams,
http://www.houstonprofootball.com/draft/prospects/williamsm.html
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
227
Alan Milstein, of the New Jersey law firm Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose &
Podolsky, was Maurice Clarett’s attorney.
228
Gene Upshaw has been Executive Director of the NFLPA since June 1983. Gene
Upshaw Biography, at http://www.manheimtouchdownclub.com/upshaw_bio.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005). Paul Tagliabue has been the NFL Commissioner since 1989. Paul
Tagliabue, at http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nfl/comish/tagliabue.html (last updated
Aug. 26, 2002).
229
See Yale Law School Faculty, Ralph K. Winter, at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/faculty/rkw2/profile.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
230
See id.
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on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals since 1982.231 My
personal opinion is that if you could pick a single jurist in this
country who knows the most about the question of the overlap and
interrelationship between labor and antitrust, it would be Judge
Winter. He authored the Wood opinion that has been referred to,
and several other very important opinions.232 I would suspect,
without knowing of course, that if and when this case gets to a
merits appeal in the Second Circuit, he will be on the panel.233 If
he is on the panel, I would expect that he would write the opinion,
and frankly I hope he does because I would tend to accept
whatever Judge Winter might have to say in this circumstance.
PROF. ROBERTS: And you know what he’ll say too, don’t
you, Jay?
PROF. MOYER: No, I’m not one hundred percent certain
anymore, but I am reasonably certain.
MR. FEHER: One thing I will note is that the Second Circuit
does have random assignments, and so we will see.
PROF. ROBERTS: Jay, can I just ask a question? I have to ask
David a question as to whether or not the NFL could adopt a rule
excluding the class of convicted sports gamblers from playing in
the NFL, or is that a per se illegal rule?
MR. FEHER: A class of convicted sports gamblers?
PROF. ROBERTS: Yes, all people who have been convicted of
sports gambling and steroid use, let’s put it that way.
MR. FEHER: I actually think that the current collective
bargaining agreement largely addresses the subject.234
PROF. ROBERTS: Forget the agreement. There’s no union.
You said under the antitrust laws if you exclude a class of people
it’s per se illegal.
MR. FEHER: No, I didn’t.
231

See id.
See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
233
Judges Sack, Sotomayor, and Kaplan actually sat on the panel in the Second Circuit
decision. Judge Winter was not present. Judge Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
court. See Clarett II, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
234
See NFL CBA, supra note 32, App. C, ¶ 15; id. art. XLIV, § 6.
232
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PROF. ROBERTS: Or you can use “quick look.”
MR. FEHER: No, I didn’t say any class. It’s going to depend
upon the circumstances of the rule and what it’s directed to.
PROF. ROBERTS: That’s not what you said.
MR. FEHER: But even under the per se rule, when you have a
classic group boycott, you don’t just say, “You’re excluded.” If
you passed a rule that said you’re excluding two-year-olds from
participating in the NFL, that, I would not argue, is something
which would be struck down under the antitrust law.
PROF. ROBERTS: Why? What’s the difference between
twenty-two and two?
MR. FEHER: We could have a discussion about all of the
group boycott cases that have occurred over the last twenty years,
and you know as well as I do, Gary, that even the Supreme Court
has said that the definition of classic group boycotts that are
subject to per se condemnation and those that are subject to rule of
reason is a matter that has created much confusion in the courts
over the years.235 And you can do this. You can argue by
throwing something out“Well, where does this stand in the
spectrum?”
What I’m saying is there are certain things that are white, there
are certain things that are black, even in application of the per se
rule. I think in this instance and also from a functional
matterand the Supreme Court recently said thisthat we can
have these tag lines, but ultimately what you look at is whether or
not the court views it as an appropriate case for summary
condemnation. That is fundamentally the question.
You can call it per se, you can call it “quick look.” The
Supreme Court has said that in some ways the labels don’t matter
so much as whether or not it’s appropriate for summary
condemnation.236 What I am saying here is that there are many
categories in the NFL or in other sports where, if the owners tried
to do something, it is more appropriate for it to be subject to
235

See, e.g., NW Wholesale Stationary, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 293–94 (1985).
236
See Cal. Dental Assoc. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–81 (1999).
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summary condemnation in terms of its clear restriction on the labor
market and not having any justification.237
In terms of the application of the “quick look” to this particular
case, I think there is a more than solid basis for saying—assuming
the antitrust laws apply—that you can do this on a summary basis
because the competitive effects of it are evident from the text of
the rule itself and from the literal impact of the rule upon the
market participants.238
You don’t have to say, “Well, will these people be able to
participate through these other means?” You can look at the rule
and say, “These people are going to be excluded from the market.”
And if you look at excluding from the market a group of people
who would otherwise be competing in the market and the
anticompetitive effects it is going to have on the market, I think
clearly it is going to have an effect on competition that you can
read just from the terms of the rule itself. How comfortable is the
court in saying summary condemnation is fine?
The Supreme Court did summary condemnation of the NCAA
broadcast rules in Board of Regents.239 Clearly it did not think that
a full-blown rule of reason was necessary.240 And you could say,
“What if hypothetically it was somewhat different?” and you’d get
out of that zone of comfort.
But I think that Judge Scheindlin was comfortable. Whether
every judge would be comfortable we could argue a long time.
PROF. MOYER: Gentlemen, I think we’re getting a little
PROF. ROBERTS: I’m sorry I asked the question, but I have
to say I couldn’t disagree more.
PROF. MOYER: In any case, I think it’s about time we hear
from the audience. Anyone who has any questions, please so
indicate. Yes, sir?

237

See generally Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (analyzing the
question of summary condemnation in terms justifiable restrictions on the labor market).
238
See supra notes 90–109 and accompanying text.
239
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
240
See id.
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QUESTION: Not a question, just a comment. I believe there is
a case which is essentially Professor Roberts’ hypothetical,
gambling under the antitrust laws’ gambling restrictions, which
was Molinas v. NBA,241 where the court found that this did not
violate the antitrust laws.242
PROF. MOYER: That was in the good old days when judges
could take a look at a fact situation and say, “Well, that’s
reasonable,” and say so and make that the ground of decision.243
PROF. ROBERTS: Of course, they could also say “that’s not
reasonable” and cut the ground for decision, too.244
PROF. MOYER: That’s true, too.
PROF. ROBERTS: That’s the problem with it.
QUESTIONER: I agree with David that everything should
violate the antitrust laws.
VOICE: That’s Chris Meyer from Weil Gotshal.
VOICE: Unless the union agrees.
PROF. MOYER: In the back?
QUESTION: Three of the panelists raised policy issues related
to age, like physical and psychological maturity, as to when
athletes are ready to be professionals, when they should be able to
forgo their childhood, their education, etc.245 I have a comment
and a question.
The question basically is what ever happened to free market
choices and the choice of the individual?
It was raised that the NBA teams take a huge risk in signing
these young players.246 The point is if a player wants to pursue
that type of employmentI mean, Maurice Clarett can choose to
be a grocery bagger or to wipe windows on a skyscraper.247 If he
241

190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
See id. at 243.
243
Id. at 244.
244
Id.
245
See supra text accompanying notes 100–102 (Roberts), 129–138 (Ganz), 157–159
(Cornwell).
246
See Chris Haft, Draft is High Risk, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 2, 1999, at D1.
247
Cf. id.
242
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wants to try his hand at being a professional football player and
there are teams out there that understand the risk that he is young
and possibly immature, they can hire psychological experts and
doctors to help them with that decision.248 If the teams are willing
to take that risk, I don’t see why the NFL should be able to bar
them from doing so.249
I think another overall comment is that—kind of like what
Gary Roberts was saying, with the Judge making kind of ridiculous
rulings because these things are in the context of sports—I think
that our reverence for sports creates some type of concept that the
professional sports leagues, like the NFL or the NBA, are
government entities that can make these rules on behalf of citizens’
rights.250
Anyway, back to the age limitation, I wanted to hear some of
the opinions of panelists who support the concept that maybe NFL
players should be twenty-one or WNBA players should be twentytwo, when you have other sports leagues—which some of you
actually represent—that consistently hire sixteen-year-olds. For
example, Major League Soccer just signed a fourteen-year old.251
The basic reason why they do that is so they can snag these guys
into long-term contracts in order to sell them as commodities to a
European club and make millions of dollars.252
So where is the consistency between signing fourteen-year-old
players and not being able to sign a twenty-one-year-old?
PROF. ROBERTS: Is that a legal question? That doesn’t
really go to the legal issues of whether or not there is an antitrust
violation. That is just sort of your own “is this fair for Maurice?”
comment.
248

Cf. id.
Cf. id.
250
See, e.g., What Should Baseball Do About Drugs?, at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_MLB1204.msp (Professors Gary Roberts and Paul Finkelman
debate over steroid policy in Major League Baseball and allude to the power of the
institution to set up laws restricting its use) (Dec. 13–16, 2004).
251
See Joe Burris, Child’s Play: More and More, Pro Arena is Becoming a Teen Scene,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2004, at C17 (discussing teenage soccer sensation Freddy Adu
of D.C. United).
252
See U.S. Soccer Scores Coup with Adu, SUNDAY MAIL, Nov. 23, 2003, at 70.
249
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QUESTIONER: Well, you raised the age issue. I believe three
of you raised the age issue as a policy issue.
PROF. ROBERTS: I didn’t.
MR. FEHER: What I actually think is interesting is that the
union and management can consider and debate all sorts of policy
arguments that have nothing to do with competition.253 You know,
Upshaw and Tagliabue just think it’s good from a public relations
point of view not to have eighteen-year-olds in the NFL, and they
can decide with very wide discretion that they think it’s not a good
idea for the NFL and they’re going to agree to it in collective
bargaining using all of these various safety policy issues.254
But the Supreme Court has been clear that in antitrust analysis,
you need to look at issues relating to competition; you can’t justify
a restraint on the basis of public policy matters unrelated to
competition.255
And so, even if you think this is stupid and there ought to be a
law, your remedy is to make a new law; it is not that the antitrust
laws are repealed. Absent some other agreement, the antitrust laws
say you compete on the merits.256 The Supreme Court has called it
this country’s “charter of economic liberty.”257 I believe that, and
that’s what we need to keep in mind when we look at these
decisions.
MR. CORNWELL: That essentially begs the question, though.
If it’s part of a collective bargaining agreement, then that begs the
question as to whether it’s good policy. I understand your
253
For some of the policy arguments raised by the panelists, see supra text
accompanying notes 100–102 (Roberts), 129–138 (Ganz), 157–159 (Cornwell).
254
See Fuhrman, supra note 14, at 589.
255
See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
220 (1993) (“By its terms, the Robinson-Patman Act condemns price discrimination only
to the extent that it threatens to injure competition. The availability of statutory
defenses . . . confirms that Congress did not intend to outlaw price differences that result
from or further the forces of competition.”).
256
See, e.g., id. at 223 (“As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a
relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator,
and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate pricecutting.”).
257
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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perspective, but I disagree with it because I think you are largely
the opponent of my position, which is that these kids have the right
to fail. I don’t think that’s a compelling argument.
The overwhelming evidence, in the NFL at least, is that a
substantial number of players who meet the eligibility
requirements don’t last.258 We are likely to now find, if the
Judge’s ruling is to stand, that a substantial number of them who
don’t meet the eligibility requirement are also likely to fail.259
I don’t think it’s a compelling argument to suggest that these
young men have the right to fail, especially when you think about
what goes on with “student” athletes at major football programs.
They don’t spend a whole lot of time on the student part.260
My view is that playing in the NFL should be a head start on
the rest of your life, it should not be the end of it. If you come in
as a middle-rounder, and last “one and done,” one contract, the
likelihood is that you are going to have difficulty finding gainful
employment.261
Now, I’m not quite sure what that young man won in being
able to win that argument. I think it’s a compelling policy reason
to impose the eligibility requirement.
PROF. ROBERTS: And there are all kinds of examples in our
society where people have minimum requirements. I know I was
madder than hell I had to spend three years in law school. I had a
law firm that was ready to hire me after my first year, but by God
the California people wouldn’t let me practice law until I got three
years out of college and got a law degree.
I mean, in every profession there are minimum requirements.
You can question what they should be. But the notion that any
minimum requirement is somehow fundamentally unfair I just
258

See Pat Kirwan, Roll the Dice (June 19, 2002), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside_game/pat_kirwan/news/2002/06/19/rookies_looking_back.
259
Id.
260
See Steve Ganczaruk, Student Athletes Gravitate Toward Similar Degrees, at
http://cronkitezine.asu.edu/spring2004/athletes.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005)
(documenting how college football players tend to have easier majors and lower
graduation rates).
261
See Michael Voss, Life after Football No Picnic (May 16, 2004), at
http://www.realfooty.theage.com.au/realfooty/articles/2004/05/15/1084570997324.html.
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don’t accept. The question is whether or not this is an appropriate
minimum requirement in this case.
PROF. MOYER: The policy question is what the question
recognizes, and I think it’s fair to say that all of us up here would
say whatever the policy is, if the NFL Players’ Association and the
NFL Management Council agree on it, that’s the policy, and judges
should stay the hell out of it.
QUESTION: Just a further comment. I think the reason why
the age requirement and the eligibility requirement are as high as
they are in the sports arena is because these are public figures and
people want to idolize them. But there are a lot of collective
bargaining units that have age requirements.262 The construction
workers’ union and the electrical workers’ unions, for example,
have a lot of service requirements before you become a member of
those unions.263 So sports are not unique in that respect. It is
consistent with a lot of other collective bargaining unions.
MR. CORNWELL: Well, it is unique to a certain extent,
because the compelling factor that makes us want to relax the
eligibility rules is money, and not particularly being especially
skilled.264 Now, if you are a child prodigy and you are ready to go
to a law firm, maybe that’s a great argument. But here, it’s not that
he is particularly skilled, it’s just the draw of the money.265
QUESTIONER: But an age requirement exists in many
collective bargaining units.
MR. FEHER: One thing I want to note is that I think it’s a little
bit more of a “hot button” issue here because of some of the
failures that have occurred in the NCAA, in the sense that in other
industries quite often if you don’t satisfy one age requirement in a
particular industry, you can go out and get another job in a related
area or do something else and make a living. These kids, as we all
262

See, e.g., Information Sheet for the Apprenticeship Training Program, at
http://www.sheetmetallocal25.org/training/Apprentice%20App%20Instructions.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2005) (“Applicants must be at least 17 (seventeen) years of age and in
good physical shape.”).
263
See id.
264
See John Gehring, Educators Troubled by NFL-Draft Ruling, EDUC. WK., Feb. 18,
2004, at 3, available at http://www.usafootball.com/features/edWeek.html.
265
Id.
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know from our idolatry of sports, are pursuing a dream, where a lot
of them believe that sports is the way to get up and out in America,
even though when you look at the numbers, the odds are incredibly
long and hard.266
If Maurice Clarett doesn’t go into the NFLhis problem was
that back at Ohio State he was producing millions of dollars for
that university and he was getting nothing, other than an
“education.”267 But I think we’ve seen in the press what some of
the examinations being provided to the University of Georgia
basketball players were like: How many halves are there in a
basketball game?268 How many points do you get for a three-point
shot?269 I’m not joking about that.
QUESTION: You have Georgetown, you have Virginia Tech,
and they all have great
PROF. ROBERTS: David, you better be careful. You might
get sued for defamation here.
MR. FEHER: I am only stating things that I think are a matter
of public record.
And in terms of saying that there are issues in the NCAA, I
think you only need to look at Ken Starr, for example, who was
saying that he watches professional basketball a lot more than
college basketball becauseI mean, Ken’s a conservative guy
when it comes to markets generally, and he has terrible problems
when it comes to the NCAA, and a lot of people do. I think part of
the reason why it’s a “hot button” issue is because a lot of these
kids, if they don’t turn pro, are left in another market where they’re
subject to market abuse.
PROF. MOYER: Can we have one or two more questions,
please?
266

See Kirwan, supra note 258.
See Dan Le Batard, Clarett’s Only Mistake—Not Taking More, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
21, 2004, at 7D, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/sports/columnists/dan_le_batard/10237228.htm?1c.
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See Steve Hummer, Old Dogs, New Principles, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 5, 2004, at
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QUESTION: You say they are subject to market abuse because
the odds are long. You could say that about actors, models, artists,
and many other entrepreneurs. Ninety-eight percent of the SAG
membership doesn’t work in any given year.270 So why is that
relevant?
MR. FEHER: People in that market operate in the market and
you earn whatever you’re entitled to in a competitive market. The
difference is if you’re a student athlete in the NCAA, you can
produce millions of dollars in earnings, but not for you.
So, in effect, the NCAA has operated in various ways as a
cartel, where they have passed rules that are commercially driven.
Some of the rules are educationally driven, but they have passed a
lot of rules that are commercially driven that, in effect, deprive
student-athletes of the money they produce, in exchange for very
little or nothing.271
QUESTIONER: I’m thinking of the athlete who wants to come
out.
PROF. MOYER: We are getting way far afield now from our
topic.
Who has a question on this topic?
QUESTION: I don’t know nearly as much about the labor
exemption as any one of you, but my understanding of it is that the
reason we have a criterionlike whether it’s a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, whether it was arm’s-length or notis
because when the non-statutory labor exemption was crafted, it
was a compromise.272 Courts did not want a total exemption
because they recognized the possibility that there could be cases
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See generally U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, Actors,
Producers, and Directors (discussing the difficult employment prospects SAG members
and other actors face), available at http://stats.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos093.pdf (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005).
271
See Nathan Chaisson, Athletes Should Be Paid to Play, COLLEGIATE TIMES, at
http://www.siue.edu/ALESTLE/library/SPRING2001/mar20/paidtoplay.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
272
See Lacie Kaiser, The Flight from Single-Entity Structured Sport Leagues, 2 DEPAUL
J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 22 (2004).
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where labor combined with management to be exclusionary, to do
things that might violate antitrust law.273
I wonder if that’s a possibility here. I’m thinking about the
New England Patriots. They have been very adroit at getting rid of
older players and getting younger players to replace them.274 I
wonder if Lawyer Malloy and Ty Law and those guys, if they go to
their union and they discuss Maurice Clarett, where are these guys
going to come down?275 Wouldn’t it be in their interest to keep the
Maurice Claretts out of the NFL? Isn’t it possible that it’s in the
interest of the NFL Players’ Association as well as the NFL to join
together and exclude these younger players?
MR. GANZ: Sure, it may be, but it is certainly not unusual for
a typical bargaining agreement to disadvantage prospective and
recently hired employees.276 They are put on probation, their
salaries are lower, etc.,—even in professional sports.277 In the
NBA, for example, there is a rookie scale: If you are drafted in the
twenty-third pick in the first round, you get X dollars this year, X+
in year two, and X++ in year three, period.278 Whether you’re
LeBron James or anybody else, you can’t make as much money as
a team might be willing to pay you.279 That was something that
was supported very enthusiastically by the union and veteran
players because it allowed more money to go to the veteran
players.280 That’s what unions do. They protect the current, the
living, in preference to the unborn.
MR. CORNWELL: The language from the decision even notes
that. It says: “‘Newcomers in the industrial context routinely find
273

Id.
See Ian Logue, Pats Start Preparing for Eagles, at http://www.patsfans.com/stories/display_story.php?story_id=2460 (Aug. 11, 2004).
275
Law and Milloy played together for the New England Patriots from 1996–2002 and
are members of the NFLPA. See Lawyer Milloy, at http://www.nfl.com/players/playerpage/3965 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005); Ty Law, at http://www.nfl.com/players/playerpage/3820 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
276
See, e.g., NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VIII [hereinafter NBA CBA],
available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba/cba.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
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themselves disadvantaged vis-à-vis those already hired. . . . that is
[] a commonplace consequence of collective agreements.’”281 But
then it continues: “Clarett’s eligibility was not the union’s to trade
away.”282
Judge Scheindlin gives but then completely departs from the
rationale that supports that non-members are routinely
disadvantaged by a collective bargaining agreement.283 In essence,
the language and the rationale she cites do not support the
conclusion that she reaches.284
Also along the lines of your observation, the union and the
NFL agreed to give teams relief under the salary cap with respect
to minimum salaries to ensure that older, veteran players would
still be employable, as opposed to a team just going to the younger
player for whom a lower minimum salary applied.285 So even in
that instance they took steps to protect the interests of the older
players.286
PROF. MOYER: In other words, it happens routinely.
There is one more question over here, please.
QUESTION: I just want to be clear about certain things that I
thought I heard from everyone. Is Clarett being excluded solely on
the basis of his age or the number of years that he has been out of
high school?
PROF. MOYER: The latter.287
QUESTIONER: If so, that doesn’t relate to any building up of
him as a person or an individual. It’s just a time period exclusion,
it seems to me, as I hear it from you guys. Can these other unions,
like the steelworkers’ union or the electricians’ unions, just
arbitrarily say, “Hey, guys, we only want people in our union who

281

Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809
F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987)).
282
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283
Id. at 395–96.
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See id.
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See NFL CBA, supra note 32, art. XVII, § 2.
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Id., art. XXXVIII, § 6.
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Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
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are twenty-five to forty-five?” Has an exclusion based solely on
age like this ever been challenged before this decision and upheld?
PROF. MOYER: Anybody up here know the answer to that?
MR. GANZ: Well, there are age discrimination laws that
would obviously apply to unions that restrict their membership.288
Many states, New York included, have age discrimination laws
that apply starting at age eighteen.289 So that’s a separate question.
I have never seen a case like that, but theoretically a union
could unilaterally adopt a requirement for membership in the
union. If it didn’t violate some age discrimination law or anything
like that, it would be perfectly fine.
PROF. ROBERTS: The typical union is not going to have an
interest in making those age distinctions. Sports are unique
because the players need to reach a certain level of physical
maturity before they are likely to be successful—so age becomes a
relevant issue.290 It’s not a relevant issue in most bargaining units,
at least at some point. I mean, obviously the Army won’t take you
until you are seventeen.291 There are probably other situations.
QUESTIONER: What you just described makes age the key
issue. Is the physical ability why age might be irrelevant in some
of these other unions but relevant in sports? Because this guy is
obviously great.292 I mean, he did great things.293
PROF. ROBERTS: I was obviously a great lawyer after my
first year of law school, but they wouldn’t let me practice. I mean
the point is you sometimes

288

See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 130–45 (McKinney 2004).
See id. §§ 132–38.
290
See Easterblogg, supra note 129 (arguing that “[p]erformance in team sports requires
maturity, which in this context usually means the early twenties”).
291
See Enlist in the US Army, at http://www.army.com/enlist (last visited Jan. 31, 2005)
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QUESTION: But that wasn’t based solely on age. You had to
go two more years and then pass the bar.
PROF. ROBERTS: But when you’re talking about playing
sports, age and physical maturity are relevant.294 And yes, there
may be an occasional exception, just like there’s an occasional
exception of somebody who could practice law before they get
their law degree.295
But we have to set minimum entry
requirements into various professions.296
The question is: Is this an appropriate restriction? Sure, there
are always going to be exceptions to any rule that you adopt. But
can you adopt a general rule even though it might unfairly impact a
tiny number of people? To me that’s not an antitrust question.
MR. FEHER: In some ways I think the press hasn’t focused on
what I think is the more radical conclusion of this decision, which
is that the union and management can’t agree on it.297 In some
ways, people have been treating Clarett as being either the end of
the world or the best thing.
It involves some terribly important antitrust and labor law
issues.298 But so long as unions and management have the capacity
to work it out, in most cases they will and it won’t be such a big
deal. But the real difficult problem here, I think, is Judge
Scheindlin’s finding that you cannot do it.299
I’m not saying that the current appeal isn’t important, because
it is terribly important, in part because of these antitrust and labor
law issues. But so long as there is a determination that the union
and management can work these things out, I think in most cases it
will happen.
PROF. ROBERTS: David, would you at least agree that if in
fact the NFL proposed to the union that they’re going to have a
three-year-out-of-high-school rule and they bargain to impasse and
294

See Easterblogg, supra note 129.
See Rules of the Court of Appeals for Admission of Attorneys and Counselors at Law,
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the NFL unilaterally implements it, that the Brown300 decision
would protect that as well, even though the union hasn’t agreed to
it?
MR. FEHER: I agree it would be a different factual
circumstance than what we’ve got here.
MR. CORNWELL: The answer is yes.
MR. ROBERTS: I know you don’t like the Brown decision.
PROF. MOYER: Gentlemen, on that inconclusive yet
interesting note, we thank the audience for your attention and the
panel for its input.

300

518 U.S. 231 (1996).

